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Expedited Removal and Due Process:
“A Testing Crucible of Basic Principle”
in the Time of Trump
Daniel Kanstroom*
[A]liens who have once passed through our gates, even
illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to
traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process
of law. 1
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I. Introduction

This Essay examines a twenty-year-old deportation system
known as expedited removal that the government has intimated
may be expanded.2 Invoking Henry Hart’s famous 1953 Dialogue,
in which he wrote, “[J]udicial review in exclusion and deportation
cases . . . provides a testing crucible of basic principle,”3 the Essay
explores what that crucible is, what basic principles it invokes, and
whom it is testing.
All legal enforcement regimes confront two related but distinct
fundamental problems. The first problem is that of balancing
efficiency against (substantive and procedural) rights. The second
problem is that of protecting society against potentially dangerous
accretions of government power.
Ronald Dworkin famously once referred to rights as “trumps.”4
Rights, as the analogy to card games runs, demand that their
holders are treated in unusual ways that may override even the
most powerful social aims and government goals.5 This usage may
now seem humorous, ironic, and perhaps tragic in the Trump era,
especially regarding expedited immigration enforcement. Previous
administrations and the federal judiciary must also, however, bear
responsibility for the rather deplorable current state of affairs in
expedited removal (and in other “fast-track” immigration
systems).6 As the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) put it in
2. See infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text (recounting the expansion
of expedited removal under the second Bush administration).
3. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1389 (1953)
(emphasis added).
4. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (Harv. Univ. Press,
1977).
5. See id. at xi (“Individuals have rights when . . . a collective goal is not a
sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have
or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury upon
them.”).
6. See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND
THE NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA (2012) (describing the rise of fast-track
mechanisms). See also AM. C.L. UNION, AMERICAN EXILE: RAPID DEPORTATIONS
THAT BYPASS THE COURTROOM 10–30 (2014) (critiquing expansion of such
mechanisms); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the
Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 3 (2014) (cataloguing removal
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2002, “[e]xpedited removal . . . represented a dramatic assault on
the due process rights . . . . [It grants] extraordinary and
unprecedented power to low-level immigration officers to remove
individuals without review and without a fair hearing.”7
Such concerns transcend this specific system, as there are
many other forms of fast-track deportation systems and no
shortage of rights infringements even in “regular” immigration
courts. Indeed, some judicial modalities raise similar concerns,
such as the 2005 initiative called “Operation Streamline,” in which
noncitizens faced routinized pleas and sentences before magistrate
judges, in processes that raised substantial concerns about lack of
proper representation, due process, among other issues.8
Rights protection in enforcement regimes is typically
accomplished by describing such rights in constitutions, statutes,
judicial decisions, regulations, and other authorities.9 Another
mechanisms); Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court,
90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 193 (2017) (“[S]hadow proceedings . . . either entirely or
effectively bypass immigration court adjudication.”); Kari Hong, The Costs of
Trumped-Up Immigration Enforcement Measures, 2017 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO
119, 124 (2017) (discussing Trump’s executive orders); Jill E. Family, Beyond
Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the Immigration
Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 542, 579–82 (2011) (discussing
diversions from immigration court).
7. Am. C.L. Union, ACLU Comments on INS Notice to Expand Expedited
Removal, AM. C.L. UNION (Nov. 13, 2002), https://www.aclu.org/other/aclucomments-ins-notice-expand-expedited-removal?redirect=aclu-comments-insnotice-expand-expedited-removal (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 694–98 (9th Cir. 2009)
(recounting procedures under Operation Streamline); see also Daniel Kanstroom,
Smart(er) Enforcement: Rethinking Removal, Structuring Proportionality, and
Imagining Graduated Sanctions, 30 J. L. & POL. 465, 472 (2015) (“Such mass
processing raises serious concerns about proper representation, due process, and
many other important legal values.”); Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S.
Criminal-Immigration Convergence and its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 105, 107 (2012) (“[Since 1997 . . . approximately one million immigrants
have been deported or removed from the United States as a consequence of a
criminal conviction.”); JOANNA LYDGATE, ASSEMBLY-LINE JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF
OPERATION STREAMLINE 4 (2010), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_
Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf (“Operation Streamline raises significant legal and
policy concerns . . . .”).
9. See, e.g., Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d at 698–99 (reviewing guilty pleas under
Operation Streamline for violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure).

1326

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323 (2018)

protection mode is the development of oversight systems. The
latter mode aims to protect society against potentially dangerous
accretions of government power. This concern, which is subtler, is
commonly denominated as the “slippery slope,” the “canary in the
coalmine,” and, most venerably, “guarding the guardians.”10 It may
also implicate concerns about “perverse incentives,” a framing that
may apply both to government power and to individual actions.11
Both problems—that of protecting basic individual rights and
that of worrisome accretions of government power—have become
especially acute in the Trump Administration. President Trump
and his minions (including most prominently Jeff Sessions, John
Kelly, Kris Kobach, and Stephen Miller) seem profoundly
uncommitted to the ideas of rights for noncitizens (or their
families), to the legitimacy of judges, and even, perhaps, to the rule
of law other than in a crudely binary, instrumental sense.
The “testing crucible” in Hart’s formulation12 also implicates
“Trumpism,” which—to the extent that it is a coherent political
ideology—embodies a resurgent nationalism of a type also now
prevalent in Europe,13 Australia,14 and Israel,15 among other
places, with impulses deeply connected to xenophobia and racism.
This connects easily and fluidly to expansions of fast-track,
rights-infringing systems of exclusion and deportation. Such
trends fundamentally challenge the relationship between
10. See infra Part IV (reviewing oversight issues within United States
Customs and Border Protection (CBP)).
11. See infra notes 139–150 (noting CPB human rights abuses).
12. See Hart, supra note 3, at 1389 (presenting the crucible formulation).
13. See Simon Shuster, Steve Bannon Takes Trumpism to Europe and Gets
a Rock Star’s Welcome, TIME (Mar. 7, 2018), http://time.com/5189141/stevebannon-zurich-speech-populism-tariffs/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (discussing
Trumpism’s reception in Europe) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
14. See Ifran Yusuf, Trumpism Has Entered the Australia Mainstream,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/
trumpism-has-entered-the-australia-mainstream-20161124-gswift.html
(last
visited Sept. 19, 2018) (discussing the rise of Trumpism in Australia) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See Oren Libermann, Israel and Trump: United Against the World, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/20/middleeast/israel-us-intl/index.html
(last
updated Jan 20, 2018) (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (reviewing Trump’s
relationship with Israel) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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executive power and law, especially in regard to human and civil
rights, and between territorial presence and rights.
The traditional response lies within the realm of judges.
However, meaningful judicial oversight of immigration
enforcement has long been hindered by “plenary power,”:
formalistic categories of civil/criminal and regulation/punishment,
deep ambivalence about the rights of noncitizens, complexities of
federalism, and—for some twenty years now—robust statutory
preclusions of judicial review.16 Thus, because noncitizens’ rights
are largely contingent on enforcement discretion, the question of
what rights a noncitizen has is inextricably linked to how the
government enforces immigration laws.17
This Essay explores the contours of a debate that—to some
degree—has occurred, and to a greater degree should be taking
place within our legal system. It considers Executive Order 13768:
Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States.18 I will
also consider a Memorandum authored by John Kelly,
Implementing the President's Border Security and Immigration
Enforcement
Improvements
Policies.19
These
executive
pronouncements will be examined against the backdrop of the
history of expedited removal, judicial responses to various
challenges of that system and of President Trump’s “travel bans,”
and recent judicial decisions that have impeded expeditious
deportation enforcement.20

16. See infra Parts IV–V (discussing failings within CBP and potential
solutions, including judicial review).
17. See infra Part IV (examining the apparent lack of rights in the current
enforcement regime).
18. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
19. Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., to
Kevin McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection et al. (Feb.
20,
2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_
ment-Policies.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., 90-DAY PROGRESS REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 13767: BORDER SECURITY AND
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS 1–15 (2017), http://altgov2.org/wpcontent/uploads/DHS_EO13767-progress-report.pdf (reviewing progress on
implementation).
20. I refer to the creative legal strategies in such cases (with approval) as
“monkey-wrench lawyering,” in that their main purpose seems to be to slow the
gears of the deportation machinery.
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Part II of this Essay describes expedited removal, as it was
conceived, as it has developed, and as it may grow. Part III
explicates President Trump’s Executive Order 13768 and the Kelly
Memorandum that advocated expansion of expedited removal.
Part IV explores various problems expedited removal raises and
the particular dangers of its proposed expansion. These problems
and dangers include predictable, and perhaps inevitable, rights
infringements and agency power concerns that are specific to U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). The Essay concludes with
exploration of judicial solutions and secondary agency possibilities
that could maintain the basic purpose of expedited removal (a
system that, for all its flaws, is superior to a wall or to outsourced
Mexican migration enforcement) while offering more realistic and
capacious protections against rights violations and agency
misconduct.
II. Expedited Removal, Then, Now, and Expanding
Although history has shown that border control can never be
perfect, US courts have long held—with only a technical exception
known as the “entry fiction”21—that noncitizens on US soil are
entitled to due process protections.22 The more particular question
of the process due to a “clandestine entrant,” especially a
noncitizen apprehended on American soil, near the border, soon
21. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)
(finding that “aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally,”
possess certain constitutional rights, but that “an alien on the threshold of initial
entry stands on a different footing”). Arrival at a port of entry does not, however,
constitute entry into the country. See id. at 213 (“In sum, harborage at Ellis Island
is not an entry into the United States.”). Thus, for due process purposes, a
noncitizen at a port of entry “is treated as if stopped at the border.” Id. at 215. See
also Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188 (1958) (noting entry fiction applies
to a noncitizen who is “paroled” into the country pending determination of
admissibility).
22. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (stating that “once an
alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes” because our
Constitution provides due process protections “to all ‘persons’ within the United
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent”); see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976)
(“Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory
is entitled to that constitutional protection.”).
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after entry, has not been definitively resolved.23 It is thus
unsurprising that various informal, fast-track removal
mechanisms have been a feature of U.S. law (especially at the
southern border) for many years.24 Some such systems have
embodied a rough, tacit compromise in that they have allowed CBP
agents to summarily remove people while not imposing the harsh
consequences of formal deportation (primarily, a ban on re-entry of
at least five years)25 unless those same people tried to return to the
U.S. again.26 Such systems, were, however, politically challenging
to defend, of dubious efficiency, and somewhat unstable
theoretically.
As the legal category of asylum developed after 1980, formal
procedures became increasingly available even to those caught at
the border or at ports of entry.27 Large numbers of migrants from
Cuba and Haiti fleeing to Florida in the 1980s provoked some
legislators to propose a program of “summary exclusion.”28 The aim
“was to stymie unauthorized migration by restricting the hearing,
review, and appeal process for aliens arriving without proper
23. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 94 (1903) (questioning “whether an
alien . . . who has entered the country clandestinely, and who has been here for
too brief a period to have become, in any real sense, a part of our population,
before his right to remain is disputed”).
24. See, e.g., MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING
OF MODERN AMERICA xxiv (2004) (noting that “illegal immigration is not anomalous but
inherent to the regime of immigration restriction”); Marc. R. Rosenblum, Shifts in the
US Immigration Enforcement System, HOOVER INST. (July 14, 2015),
https://www.hoover.org/research/shifts-us-immigration-enforcement-system
(last
visited Sept. 19, 2018) (“In the twenty-five years before 1996, just 3 percent of all
people expelled from the United States were formally removed . . . versus 97
percent who were informally returned.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
25. See Inadmissible aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2012) (“Any alien
who has been ordered removed . . . upon the alien’s arrival . . . and who again
seeks admission within 5 years . . . is inadmissible.”).
26. See Rosenblum, supra note 24 (discussing informal removal).
27. See Lisa J. Laplante, Expedited Removal at U.S. Borders: A World
Without a Constitution, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 213, 214, 219–20 (1999)
(discussing immigration law prior to 1996).
28. See ALISON SISKIN & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL33109, IMMIGRATION POLICY ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS 3 (2005),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P13.pdf (reviewing exclusion’s legislative
history).
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documents at ports of entry.”29 Though not adopted then,30
summary exclusion was revitalized in 1995 with a new name:
“expedited removal of arriving aliens”31 and became law as part of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) in 1996, signed by President Bill Clinton.32 As it evolved,
this new system was applied both at the border and, later, to some
“clandestine entrants.”33
Essentially, expedited removal now allows agents of the
executive branch to remove certain noncitizens quickly and, in
many cases, completely outside of immigration courts and federal
courts.34 It does this by drastically restricting a variety of due
29. Id.
30. See id. (“It was included and then deleted from legislation that became
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.”).
31. Id. at 3–4.
32. “The IIRIRA provisions amended § 235 of the INA. For an earlier enacted
version of expedited removal see The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA; P.L. 104-132, §422).” Id. at 4 n.18. See generally PHILIP G.
SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL BATTLE TO SAVE POLITICAL
ASYLUM IN AMERICA (2000) (discussing immigration policy’s evolution in the
United States); see also MARK HETFIELD ET AL., U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL VOLUME I:
FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS, 1–2 (2005), http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/
default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/Volume_I.pdf
(presenting
legislative history).
33. See SISKIN & WASEM, supra note 28, at 2
Under regulation, expedited removal only applied to arriving aliens at
ports of entry from April 1997 to November 2002. In November 2002,
the Bush Administration extended expedited removal to aliens
arriving by sea who are not admitted or paroled. Subsequently, in
August 2004, expedited removal was expanded to aliens who are
present without being admitted or paroled, are encountered by an
immigration officer within 100 air miles of the U.S. international
southwest land border, and have not established to the satisfaction of
an immigration officer that they have been physically present in the
United States continuously for the 14-day period immediately
preceding the date of encounter.
(footnotes omitted). These entrants are technically known as “entrants without
inspection,” or EWI’s. See INA 212(a)(6)(A): Entry Without Inspection (EWI),
MESSERSMITH L., https://messersmithlaw.com/ina-212a6a/ (last visited Sept. 19,
2018) (providing practical terminology usage) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
34. See AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, A PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL 1–2 (2017),
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process protections that had been available to noncitizens who are
caught at or (relatively) near US borders or ports of entry.35 It
imposes mandatory detention and essentially eliminates hearing,
appeal, and judicial review processes36 for most noncitizens
arriving or caught (within 14 days of border crossing)37 in the
United States without proper documents (there are special
protections for asylum-seekers, discussed below). Noncitizens who
have been expeditiously removed are barred from returning to the
United States for five years.38
Also, the statute deems certain noncitizens on U.S. soil to be
“unadmitted.”39 Prior to 1996, a noncitizen denied admission at a
port of entry was “excluded” from entry.40 The immigration
statutes contained both specific exclusion grounds and special
procedures that were less formal than those that governed
deportations from the interior.41 The first critical fact as to which
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/a_prim
er_on_expedited_removal.pdf (describing limitations under expedited removal).
35. See id. (“‘Expedited removal’ refers to the legal authority given to even
low-level immigration officers to order the deportation of some non-U.S. citizens
without any of the due-process protections granted to most other people . . . .”).
36. See id. (outlining the expedited removal process); see also SISKIN &
WASEM, supra note 28, at 4–5 (describing the basics of removal). Judicial review
of an expedited removal order is available in habeas corpus proceedings, but the
review is limited to whether the petitioner is an “alien,” was ordered expeditiously
removed, or was previously granted legal permanent resident (LPR), refugee or
asylee status. See MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43226, AN
OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION MATTERS 5 (2013),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43226.pdf (describing judicial review for those
aliens not placed in regular removal proceedings).
37. See Designating Aliens For Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877,
48877 (Aug. 11, 2004) (applying the day limit).
38. See Inadmissible aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2012) (“Any alien
who has been ordered removed . . . upon the alien’s arrival . . . and who again
seeks admission within 5 years . . . is inadmissible.”).
39. This colloquial term is not in the statute. See id. § 1182(6)(A)(i) (“An alien
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in
the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney
General, is inadmissible.”).
40. See David A. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New
Immigration Rules, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 673, 689 (2000) (noting the prior scheme).
41. See id. (“Formerly the main statutory distinction fell between exclusion
cases and deportation cases . . . clandestine entry lasting but a few minutes could
vault the individual into the more favored category of deportable alien.”).
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procedures applied (with some technical exceptions) was where one
stood at the time of arrest.42 Noncitizens who were expelled from
the interior were “deported,” regardless of whether they had ever
been lawfully present and regardless of how long they had been in
the United States.43 This system dovetailed with prevailing due
process norms that protected those who had “passed through our
gates, even illegally . . . .”44
The IIRIRA replaced this territorial conceptual dividing line
between exclusion and deportation with the concept of
“admission.”45 Those who had been lawfully admitted retained
formal procedural protections.46 However, persons present in the
interior without having attained lawful admission were treated
substantively like those denied admission at a port of entry.47 And
some of them lost virtually all procedural protections as well.48
From April 1997 to November 2002, expedited removal only
applied to arriving noncitizens at ports of entry.49 Even there it
was strongly criticized.50 In November 2002, the Bush
Administration expanded expedited removal to noncitizens caught
within the United States who had arrived by sea but who had not
been physically and continuously present in the country for two
years prior to apprehension.51 This was a very important move, as
42. See id. (“[T]he boundary was marked by the concept of entry.”).
43. See id. (“[C]landestine entry lasting but a few minutes could vault the
individual into the more favored category of deportable alien.”).
44. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
45. See Martin, supra note 40, at 689 (“The 1996 amendments deleted the
definition of ‘entry’ from the statute and replaced it with a definition of
‘admission,’ which now marks the major statutory boundary.”).
46. See id. (“[G]rounds of inadmissibility apply both to persons at the border
and to clandestine entrants who have never gone through the process of formal
inspection and admission . . . .”).
47. See id. (“[N]o matter how long they have been physically present in the
United States.”).
48. See id. at 689–90 (“After all, there was always a certain anomaly . . . in
giving greater rights to persons who completely evaded border screening, while
those who presented themselves for inspection as the law required were rewarded
with constitutional limbo.”).
49. See SISKIN & WASEM, supra note 28, at 2 (recounting legislative history).
50. See, e.g., Laplante, supra note 27, at 215–16 (critiquing expedited
removal in 1999).
51. See Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under
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it internalized expedited removal. In August 2004, expedited
removal was further expanded to many more people who were
present in the U.S.:
[T]o aliens who are present without being admitted or paroled,
are encountered by an immigration officer within 100 air miles
of the U.S. southwest land border, and cannot establish to the
satisfaction of the immigration officer that they have been
physically present in the United States continuously for the
14-day period immediately preceding the date of encounter.52

In January 2006, expedited removal was further expanded
along all U.S. borders.53 Later that year, it was applied to “illegal
alien families” apprehended in areas along the nation’s southern,
northern, and coastal borders.54 In a remarkably Orwellian
formulation, a DHS press release reported that to “house these
families,” it opened a new 500-bed facility in Texas
“specially-equipped to meet family needs.”55 Julie Myers, Assistant
Secretary for ICE, coined a strange new phrase to describe family
detention and quick deportations: “This new facility enables us to
have deterrence with dignity by allowing families to remain
Section 235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg.
68,924, 68,924 (Nov. 13, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. 235.3(b)(1)(ii) (2017))
(detailing the expedited removal process); see also SISKIN & WASEM, supra note
28, at 2 (recounting legislative history).
52. SISKIN & WASEM, supra note 28, at 2.
53. See ALISON SISKIN & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL33109, IMMIGRATION POLICY ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS 6–7 (2009),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20090130_RL33109_0da5394ccb73e22db62
86d4acd1385b88c40c35a.pdf (reviewing exclusion’s legislative history and
expansion to all borders).
54. News Release, U.S. Customs & Immigration Enforcement, DHS Closes
Loophole by Expanding Expedited Removal to Cover Alien Families (May 15,
2006), http://www.fosterglobal.com/news/DHSOpensNewFacility.pdf.
55. Id. The facility is named after T. Don Hutto, who co-founded the
Corrections Corporation of America in 1983 in Nashville, Tennessee. See
DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, DON T. HUTTO RESIDENTIAL CENTER: IMMIGRANT
DETENTION
INSPECTION
SERIES
2
(2016),
https://www.detention
watchnetwork.org/sites/default/files/Hutto%20Inspection_DWN%20and%20Gras
sroots%20Leadership_2017.pdf (recounting the facility becoming a family
detention center in 2006); Corrections Corporation of America History, FUNDING
UNIVERSE,
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/correctionscorporation-of-america-history/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (describing the
founding of CCA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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together, while sending the clear message that families entering
the United States illegally will be returned home.”56 To use
detention as “deterrence” would itself seem a violation of dignity,
as well as an unconstitutional rights violation. The purported
dignity of such deterrence was further called into very serious
question with respect to how detention was implemented.
Researchers discovered many serious problems at the facility, and
reported the following:


Hutto . . . [looked and felt] like a prison, complete with
razor wire and prison cells. . . .



The majority of children detained in these facilities
appeared to be under the age of 12.



At night, children as young as six were separated from
their parents.



Separation and threats of separation were used as
disciplinary tools.



People in detention displayed widespread and obvious
psychological
trauma. Every woman we spoke with
in a private setting cried. . . .



[P]regnant women received inadequate prenatal care.



Children . . . received one hour of schooling per day.



Families . . . received no more than twenty minutes to
go through the cafeteria line and feed their children and
themselves. Children were frequently sick from the food
and losing weight.



Families . . . received extremely limited . . . recreation
time . . . .57



Access to counsel was extremely limited.58

56.
57.

U.S. Customs & Immigration Enforcement, supra note 54.
LOCKING UP FAMILY VALUES: THE DETENTION OF IMMIGRANT FAMILIES,
WOMEN’S COMM’N FOR REFUGEE WOMEN & CHILDREN & LUTHERAN IMMIGR. AND
REFUGEE
SERV.
2
(2007),
https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/images/zdocs/famdeten.pdf.
58. See id. at 31–32 (describing access to counsel at Hutto as available, but
with much to be desired).
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As a result of such reports and, following a major lawsuit,
conditions were improved somewhat.59 Still, family detention
remains a major issue for expedited removal in the United States.60
This is especially salient in the disastrous aftermath of the Trump
Administration’s “zero tolerance” family separation fiasco during
the summer of 2018.61
Expedited removal itself raises major due process concerns
because arrest, detention, being placed in expedited removal, and
ultimately removal with a five-year ban on return, are all in the
hands of executive agents.62 In asylum cases, an immigration judge
may be involved but even then federal review is essentially
precluded.63 In most cases, a person subject to expedited removal
is detained, has no right to counsel, often has no time to
communicate with her family members or to seek legal counsel and
has no right to appeal.64

59. See ACLU Urges Congress to End Policy of Detaining Immigrant
Children, AM. C.L. UNION (Aug. 27, 2007), https://www.aclu.org/news/landmarksettlement-announced-federal-lawsuit-challenging-conditions-immigrantdetention-center?redirect=cpredirect/31469 (last visited Sept. 19, 2018)
(announcing a “landmark settlement with U.S. Customs Enforcement (ICE) that
greatly improves conditions for immigrant children and their families
inside . . . Hutto”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
60. Currently there are three immigration jails holding families. See Family
Detention,
DETENTION
WATCH
NETWORK,
https://www.detentionwatch
network.org/issues/family-detention (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (noting the
Berks, Karnes, and Dilley centers are in operation) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also Laura Smith, Here’s the Biggest Immigration Issue
That Trump Isn’t Talking About, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 12, 2017, 11:00 AM)
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/01/family-detention-immigration-ref
ugees-texas-dilley/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (discussing the present state of
detention) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
61. See, e.g., Maya Rhodan, Here Are the Facts About President Trump’s
Family Separation Policy, TIME, http://time.com/5314769/family-separationpolicy-donald-trump/ (last updated June 20, 2018) (last visited Sept. 19, 2018)
(providing an overview of the zero tolerance policy) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
62. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (describing the state of
expedited removal).
63. See A PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL, supra note 34, at 2 (noting that an
immigration judge is limited to reviewing credible fear of return).
64. See id. at 1–2 (explaining the lack of rights or process given to those
subject to expedited removal).
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And yet, courts have largely acquiesced. Part of the reason for
this was a preclusion of judicial review in the 1996 laws
themselves. The statutes stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction
to hear any challenge to the system, including challenges on due
process or other constitutional grounds, other than in a lawsuit in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia filed
within sixty days of the system's implementation.65
Defenders of expedited removal have long argued that federal
judges would undercut the basic idea of expedited removal and
would hinder the Attorney General’s ability to make managerial
adjustments if there were to be “sudden shifts in caseload.”66 Some
federal judges now rather routinely reject challenges. As one judge
laconically put it in 2014, “[t]he expedited removal statutes are
express and unambiguous. The clarity of the language forecloses
acrobatic attempts at interpretation.”67 A counter-tradition
sometimes recognizes the deep problems expedited removal poses,
while still declining to intervene due to the jurisdictional
impediments congress imposed. As one court put it in 2010:
The troubling reality of the expedited removal procedure is that
a CBP officer can create the . . . charge . . . then that same
officer, free from the risk of judicial oversight, can confirm his
or her suspicions of the person's intentions and find the person
guilty of that charge. The entire process . . . can happen without
any check on whether the person understood the proceedings,
had an interpreter, or enjoyed any other safeguards.68

As the court rather distressingly concluded, “To say that this
procedure is fraught with risk of arbitrary, mistaken, or
65. See Apprehension and Deportation of Aliens, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1275, 1277, 1279 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012))
(codifying limited judicial review) (listing matters not subject to judicial
review). In Am. Immigr. Law. Ass’n v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 47–62 (D.D.C.
1998), aff’d, 199 F.3d 1352 (D.C.Cir. 2000), the court found that plaintiffs lacked
standing to assert many of the challenges, and generally sustained the expedited
removal system without much analysis. See id. (offering review of standing and
removal procedures).
66. Martin, supra note 40, at 689.
67. Rodriguez v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. 6:14-cv-2716, 2014 WL
4675182, at *2 (W.D. La. Sept. 18, 2014), vacated by Diaz-Rodriguez v. Holder,
No. 14-31103, 2014 WL 10965184 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2014).
68. Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2010).
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discriminatory behavior . . . is not, however, to say that courts are
free to disregard jurisdictional limitations.”69
Such judicial acquiescence and the efficiency of interior
expedited removal has inspired the government to expand its use.
From a start of 23,242 in 1997, numbers rose to 89,070 in 1999,
just under half of all total removals.70 However, from 1993–1999
there were also more than 10 million recorded “voluntary
departures.”71 These included both persons “under docket control
required to depart” and not “under docket control,” those
departures not under docket control being subject to much more
informal procedures and looser record-keeping.72 As noted above,
until 2002, expedited removal procedures applied only to “aliens”
arriving at ports of entry.73 After 2004, the number of interior
removals began to rise.74 By fiscal year 2013, some 44% of all
removals from the United States were expedited removals, 75 which
included removals from the interior. In 2016, of some 240,255
removals ICE conducted, 174,923 were removals of individuals

69.
70.

Id.
IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
IMMIGRATION
AND
NATURALIZATION
SERVICE
203 (2002), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_1
999.pdf.
71. Id. at 250.
72. Id. at 250 n.2.
73. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (describing the original
application); see also IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., supra note 70, at 203 (“In
fiscal year 1999, the INS used these procedures with aliens arriving at ports of
entry who illegally attempted to gain admission by fraud or misrepresentation,
or with no entry documents, or by using counterfeit, altered, or otherwise
fraudulent or improper documents.”).
74. The 2005 DHS Statistical Yearbook makes clear that removals include
actions that “occur at the borders of the United States, in the interior of the
country, and at designated sites outside the United States.” U.S. DEPT. HOMELAND
SEC. OFF. IMMIGR. STAT., 2005 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 1 (2006),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Stati
stics_2005.pdf.
75. See JOHN F. SIMANSKI, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC. OFF. OF IMMIGR.
STAT.,
IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS:
2013
1
(2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Enforcement_Actions_2013.p
df; see also AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 1 (describing the rise in
expedited removals).
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“apprehended at or near the border or ports of entry.”76 This
amounted to almost 73% of total removals. Of these, some 94%
were apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol agents and then
processed, detained, and removed by ICE.77 Thus, CBP is now in
many respects the lead agency for removals.78 Moreover, there is
now a backlog in the immigration courts of over half a million (due
to years of stepped-up enforcement combined with massive
underfunding of the regular immigration court system).79 This has
created both a legitimacy crisis and leaves room for renewed
support for expanding expedited removal.80 The Trump
Administration has directed immigration judges to clear at least
700 cases a year in order to receive a “‘satisfactory’ performance
rating.”81 If taken seriously, such an order—which seems of
dubious constitutionality if due process is to be taken
76. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2016 ICE
ENFORCEMENT
AND
REMOVAL
OPERATIONS
REPORT
11
(2016),
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/removal-stats-201
6.pdf.
77. See IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., supra note 70, at 11 n.4 (“The
remaining individuals were apprehended by CBP officers at ports of entry.”).
78. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the
Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 3 (2015) (“[M]ore than half of the total
population removed from the United States has bypassed a courtroom through a
speed deportation program.”).
79. See Immigration Court Backlog Tops 500,000 Cases, HUM. RTS. FIRST
(July
21,
2016),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/
immigration-court-backlog-tops-500000-cases (last visited Sept. 19, 2018)
(“[C]hronic underfunding, hiring challenges, and shifting enforcement strategies
have led to alarming backlogs in the U.S. asylum and immigration systems with
more than 620,000 pending removal and asylum cases . . . .”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). For up to date statistics, see Immigration
Court
Backlog
Tool,
TRAC
IMMIGR.,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/
immigration/court_backlog/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (providing detailed
backlog statistics) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
80. See Immigration Court Backlog Tops 500,00 Cases, supra note 79 (noting
that wait times for resolution can be five years or more); Martin, supra note 40
and accompanying text (establishing expedited removal as an alternative).
81. Nick Miroff, Trump Administration, Seeking to Speed Deportations, to
Impose Quotas on Immigration Judges, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administrationseeking-to-speed-deportations-to-impose-quotas-on-immigration-judges/2018/04/
02/a282d650-36bb-11e8-b57c-445cc4dfa5e_story.html?utm_term=.7bbff467336d
(last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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seriously—could tend to transform all removal hearings into what
amounts to expedited removal.
The Trump Administration has also intimated that it may
seek to expand expedited removal beyond its current scope to
entrants who have been in the U.S. just shy of two years.82 This
would demand a serious constitutional reconsideration of the
significance of such territorial presence for due process purposes.83
The issues—essentially involving a tension between efficiency
and rights—are among the most fundamental in the long history
of U.S. immigration law. Consider a brief recitation of the
arguments from the 1903 case of Yamataya v. Fisher84—with
which all immigration law scholars are familiar: “Here is a person
found dwelling within the United States; she is arrested and
imprisoned by a ministerial officer; she is not permitted to see her
friends or to consult with her attorneys; she is unable to speak or
understand our language . . . .”85 The lawyers continue by
highlighting what amount to hidden, deceptive—if not
nefarious—practices:
The officer does not give her any notice of the proceedings nor
any opportunity to be heard, but goes about secretly collecting
evidence against her, considering only such evidence as when
unexplained, will suit his purpose. He takes advantage of her
ignorance of our language and makes her give unintentional
answers to questions which she does not understand.86

The arguments against such practices made at the dawn of the
twentieth century are worth remembering:
[O]ur records will be searched in vain for authorities sustaining
such a proceeding, and its only parallel must be sought for in
the history of the times antedating Magna Charta. Will the
82. See JOSE MAGAÑA-SALGADO, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., FAIR
TREATMENT DENIED: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S TROUBLING ATTEMPT TO
EXPAND “FAST-TRACK” DEPORTATIONS 3–4 (2017) (detailing the proposed
expansion), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/2017-06-05_ilrc_report_fair_
treatment_denied_final.pdf.
83. See Martin, supra note 40, at 688–89 (reviewing the relationship of due
process and territorial presence).
84. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
85. Id. at 90.
86. Id.
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highest court of the land hold this proceeding to be due process
of law? It seems to us that to do so would be to strike a blow at
the very foundation of free government.87

The Court’s opinion in Yamataya was, to say the least,
brusquely unsolicitous on the merits of the due process problems
for those who do not speak English: “If the appellant's want of
knowledge of the English language put her at some disadvantage
in the investigation conducted by that officer, that was her
misfortune . . . .”88 However, the case did establish the baseline
idea that there are fundamental limitations on executive power, at
least when it is applied on our territory.89 The exact limits are
complicated, as interior expedited removal would be patently
unconstitutional were the lines not somewhat ambiguous.90
Though
some
courts
have
tended
towards
a
binary—right/privilege—sort of model,91 later cases such as
Landon v. Plascencia92 showed that, at least as to returning lawful
permanent residents, a purely binary territorial model does not
suffice.93 Recent challenges to the Trump “travel bans” also tend to
contradict a bright-line territorial principle, albeit from a different
direction.94 Another due process variant is more fluid, more
87. Id. at 91.
88. Id. at 102.
89. See id. at 100 (“But this court has never held . . . that administrative
officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of
persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due process of
law’ . . . .”).
90. See id. (finding that the executive cannot take into custody and deport
aliens who have “entered the country, and [have] become subject in all respects
to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population” without due process).
91. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)
(“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an
alien denied entry is concerned.”).
92. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
93. See id. at 32–34 (considering an alien’s rights when he resides, leaves,
and returns to United States soil).
94. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017)
(“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly and explicitly rejected the notion that the
political branches have unreviewable authority over immigration or are not
subject to the Constitution . . . .”); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 755 (2017),
vacated and remanded by 138 S. Ct. 377 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The President’s
authority is subject to . . . constitutional restraints.”); Int’l Refugee Assistance
Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded by 138
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multi-faceted, and less purely dependent on territorial presence.
One might return to the words of Henry Hart: “[C]ourts [have] a
responsibility to see that statutory authority was not transgressed,
that a reasonable procedure was used . . . and . . . that human
beings were not unreasonably subjected, even by direction of
Congress, to an uncontrolled official discretion.95
This framework directs our attention to the fundamental
problem with expedited removal: Its very existence—and its
expansion—inevitably cause serious errors and dangerous
deprivations of rights.96 The basic structure of the system, which
insulates decisions of great magnitude from judicial scrutiny,97 is
troubling. It clearly invites—indeed it incentivizes—a
transgressing of statutory authority and uncontrolled discretion by
officials on the ground. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor recent asked
during oral argument in Jennings v. Rodriguez:98 “[In] what other
area of law have we permitted a government agent on his or her
own, without a neutral party looking at that decision, to detain
someone
indefinitely?”99
That,
she
continued,
is
“lawlessness . . . basically saying that we're not a country of law,
that we're a country of arbitrariness . . . .”100
Unless one has much greater confidence in Customs and
Border Patrol agents than history and experience would warrant,
expedited removal—especially if expanded—amounts to a
systematic acceptance of arbitrariness by an agency long known
for it. Indeed, the system is full of agency-perverse incentives.
This is a concern commonly directed at noncitizens, and less
frequently at immigration agencies. Judge Jay Bybee101 for
S. Ct. 353 (2017) (“Congress granted the President broad power to deny entry to
aliens, but that power is not absolute.”).
95. Hart, supra note 3, at 1390.
96. See Martin, supra note 40, at 700 (arguing against expansion due to
overapplication risks).
97. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (outlining the lack of
judicial oversight).
98. 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
99. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830
(2018) (No. 15-1204), 2017 WL 4517127, at *6.
100. Id. at 8.
101. Human Rights Watch argued that Judge Bybee should have been
“investigated for conspiracy to torture as well as other crimes.” No More Excuses:
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example, recently bemoaned the “perverse incentives” that the
territorial rights model might offer to “aliens attempting to enter
the United States to further circumvent our immigration laws by
avoiding designated ports-of-entry.”102 Government lawyers made
a similar argument in the Third Circuit case of Castro v.
Department of Homeland Security:103 “If the clandestine entrant
were treated more favorably, that would create—and
constitutionalize—a perverse incentive for aliens to cross the
border surreptitiously rather than presenting themselves for
inspection.”104
Leaving aside many empirical, moral, and doctrinal questions
about such concerns, perverse incentives run both ways. A rather
casual dismissal of realistic concerns about agency practices is a
strange hallmark of some judicial opinions. Courts may accept that
“expedited removal proceedings permit no judicial or
administrative review, which we assume would decrease any risk
of error.”105 But the judicial conscience is salved by asserting that
the “class of aliens” to which expedited removal applies is said to
be “fairly narrow.”106 Further, some assert that “the analysis
required to determine whether an alien may be subject to
expedited removal proceedings is straightforward” or “a relatively
simple exercise” about which too much concern is unwarranted.107
But for many cases, both assertions are demonstrably untrue,
especially for asylum-seekers and others who face severe harm if
deported.108 Also, as discussed in Part IV, major mistakes are
A Roadmap to Justice for CIA Torture, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 1, 2015),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/01/no-more-excuses/roadmap-justice-ciatorture (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
102. United States v. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir.
2017), opinion withdrawn on grant of reh’g, 868 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2017), and on
reh’g, 705 Fed. Appx. 542 (9th Cir. 2017).
103. 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016).
104. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 21, Castro v. U.S. Dep’t
Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016) No. 16-812, cert. den. 137 S. Ct. 1581
(2017), 2017 WL 1046315, at *21.
105. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d at 1136.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., A PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL, supra note 34, at 2 (noting
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frequently made and CBP, a dangerously unrestrained agency,
seems unable to reform many bad practices.109 Perhaps something
more than a crude, conclusory utilitarian calculus is thus in order
for federal judges?
Let us now consider how immigration enforcement in the
Trump Administration has related to expedited removal.
III. The Trump Order and the Kelly Memorandum
A. Executive Order 13768
President Trump’s Executive Order 13768, Enhancing Public
Safety in the Interior of the United States, appeared in the Federal
Register on January 30, 2017.110 Like many immigration
enforcement measures, it was ostensibly aimed not simply at
unauthorized migration, but more broadly at “public safety.”111
The Order’s underlying assumptions and rhetorical tropes reveal
deep implicit ideas about how deportation law should be conceived
and implemented. It begins with a strikingly broad statement that
links immigration control to (undefined) ideals of national security
and safety: “Interior enforcement of our Nation’s immigration laws
is critically important to the national security and public safety of
the United States.”112
This is immediately followed by a set of common, if contestable
assumptions: “Many aliens who illegally enter the United States
and those who overstay or otherwise violate the terms of their visas
present a significant threat to national security and public safety.
This is particularly so for aliens who engage in criminal conduct in
the United States.”113
Obvious basic questions about these assertions include: How
many such “aliens” present such a threat? What is the exact nature
that “credible fear” must be evaluated).
109. See infra Part IV (discussing abuses by CBP).
110. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
111. See id. at 8799 (“[I]n order to ensure the public safety of the American
people . . . .”).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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of that threat? Why does a person’s immigration status matter if
they commit a crime?
The main goal of the Order is articulated boldly. Asserting
first—in a highly dramatic and quite unusual formulation—that,
“the Federal Government has failed to discharge this basic
sovereign responsibility,” the Order declares that “[w]e cannot
faithfully execute the immigration laws of the United States if we
exempt classes or categories of removable aliens from potential
enforcement.”114
The Order then directs executive departments and agencies
“to employ all lawful means to enforce the immigration laws of the
United States.”115 Thus, in effect, the Order rejects any sort of
discretionary, targeted, prioritized enforcement methods and
aims, presumably, to exclude all who are subject to exclusion and
to deport all who are subject to deportation. There is a certain
superficial plausibility here—why not enforce all the immigration
laws fully? The answer, of course, is that this is impossible for
logistical, cost, and many other reasons. Indeed, the Constitution
itself uses the word “faithfully” not “fully.”116
B. The Kelly Memorandum
Such unrealistic calls for full enforcement reverberate as we
consider the Kelly Memorandum. On February 20, 2017,
then-Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary John
Kelly directed DHS to issue a Federal Register notice to expand
the category of individuals subject to expedited removal.117 He
wrote that he had the authority to apply, “by designation in my
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed . . . .”).
117. Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., to
Kevin McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection et al. 7
(Feb.
20,
2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-t
he-Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-ImprovementPolicies.pdf (directing DHS to issue “a new Notice Designating Aliens Subject to
Expedited Removal”).
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sole and unreviewable discretion, the expedited removal
provisions . . . of the INA to aliens who have not . . . affirmatively
shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that they have
been continuously physically present in the United States the
two-year period . . . .”118
What might this mean? One recent study has estimated that
it could subject more than 300,000 people to expedited removal
with increased support for CBP.119 We thus return to two
fundamental questions: Is expedited removal inherently impossible
to oversee sufficiently to avoid predictable rights infringements?
Does expedited removal—by its very nature—pose a serious,
perhaps unacceptable, risk of dangerous accretions of government
agency power?
Clearly, these are both theoretical and empirical questions
which must be refined by adding “in the Trump Administration.”
As David Martin noted—correctly in my view—“If we are to have
an honest debate on the merits of ER, critics and reformers owe
the public a more accurate picture of its real functioning.”120 This
is undertaken in the next Section.
IV. Which “Basic Principles”? Whose “Perverse Incentives”?
A. The Recognized Problems of Expedited Removal
The main justification for expedited removal was, first, its
efficacy as a border control regime, primarily as to those with
“frivolous” asylum claims.121 Secondarily, it is justified—at the
border and internally—as enhancing enforcement through
deterrence because, unlike simply returning people with no
consequences, it imposes penalties on future possible re-entries.122
118. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
119. See MAGAÑA-SALGADO, supra note 82, at 4 (“The expansion . . . could
subject a minimum of 328–440 additional undocumented immigrants to expedited
removal.”).
120. Martin, supra note 40, at 681.
121. See SISKIN & WASEM, supra note 28, at 16 (“Proponents . . . contend that
aliens use frivolous appeals to postpone deportation.”).
122. See Martin, supra note 40, at 675 (“[T]o lay the groundwork for more
severe sanctions if they do not take the law enforcement hint . . . .”).
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Finally, expedited removal is commonly justified as being focused
on those with low “stakes,” as it were.123 But this is a defensive
justification against critics.
As noted, expedited removal has faced severe criticism from
human rights advocates and immigrant rights supporters from the
moment it was first conceived.124 Judges, too, as noted above, have
recognized that the system is “fraught with risk of arbitrary,
mistaken, or discriminatory behavior . . . .”125 Indeed, even the
proponents of expedited removal have recognized its potential
dangers. In 2000, in the most sustained and sophisticated defense
of the program, David Martin offered a series of admonitions and
suggestions to maintain the legitimacy of the system. Martin
urged, in summary form, that we:
1. Assure humane treatment and the ability to communicate
with family and friends . . . ;
2.

Improve internal monitoring of secondary inspection . . . ;

3. Provide for carefully designed outside monitoring and more
complete statistics . . . ;
4. Limit ER to persons with fraudulent documents or no
documents . . . ;
5.

Improve consultation arrangements . . . ;

6.

Avoid backsliding on key protections . . . ;

7. Resist any
EWIs . . . .126

temptation

to

apply

ER

routinely

to

123. See Martin, supra note 40, at 701 (relating the location of entry to the
low stakes of removal); see also Koh, supra note 6, at 200–01 (critiquing Martin).
124. See Martin, supra note 40, at 674 n.2 (collecting critiques); Karen
Musalo, Expedited Removal, 28 HUM. RTS. 12, 13 (2001) (criticizing lack of
representation during secondary inspection interrogations); Michele R. Pistone &
John J. Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to be Broken: How the Process of Expedited
Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 167, 175–93 (2006)
(cataloguing errors in the expedited removal system); Jaya Ramji, Legislating
Away International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 117, 134–41 (2001)
(offering critique of the credible fear standard, secondary inspection, and
expedited removal).
125. Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2010).
126. Martin, supra note 40, at 695–701.
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This is a thoughtful, useful, but rather optimistic list.
Though this Essay will not examine each of these criteria in detail,
let us focus on a few major issues.
B. Detention
A major impediment to assuring “humane treatment and the
ability to communicate with family and friends”127 is detention.
One simply cannot disaggregate the structural connections
between the problems of expedited removal and detention.128 Let
us start with the physical conditions. In one prominent case, for
example, plaintiffs credibly alleged that,
detainees are packed into overcrowded and filthy holding cells,
stripped of outer layers of clothing, and forced to endure
brutally cold temperatures. They are denied beds, bedding, and
sleep. They are deprived of basic sanitation and hygiene items
like soap, sufficient toilet paper, sanitary napkins, diapers, and
showers. And they are forced to go without adequate food,
water, medicine, and medical care.129

Can the government “assure humane treatment” and maintain an
ability to communicate with family and friends in the context of
massive detention systems, many of which house people who have
been arrested great distances away? How is communication to be
facilitated? Who pays for phone calls? How can families find out
where a detainee is housed? As many studies and legal actions
have shown, the CBP and DHS record on such matters does not
inspire great confidence.130
Consider, too, whether CBP has avoided “backsliding on key
protections” even for asylum-seekers, a group that is specifically
protected by the legislation that created expedited removal.131
127. Id. at 695.
128. See, e.g., Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal
Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2014) (noting that 400,000 people were
subject to civil immigration incarceration in 2012).
129. Doe v. Kelly, 878 F.3d 710, 713–14 (9th Cir. 2017).
130. See infra Part IV.C (identifying CBP failures).
131. See, e.g., Castro v. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 426–27 (3d
Cir. 2016) (reviewing statutory protections).
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Despite an ostensibly protective regime, many studies, over many
years, have repeatedly found deficiencies in CBP processes to
identify, adjudicate and protect asylum claims.132
A recent study has also concluded that expedited removal and
detention pose particular dangers to “women and their children
held in detention centers in rural, isolated locations in Texas and
Pennsylvania.”133 As the study noted, “Given that very few
asylum-seeking families speak English, most have experienced
significant trauma in their countries or during their journeys
north, and they have no right to government-appointed legal
counsel, the bureaucratic hurdles can be insurmountable.”134 The
solution is “a robust legal process and legal assistance . . . .”135 But
this, according to Martin and others, is precisely what expedited
removal was designed to avoid.136 We face, in short, what seems to
be an intractable dilemma.137

132. See, e.g., ELIZABETH CASSIDY & TIFFANY LYNCH, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION: THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM
SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 20 (2016), https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/
files/Barriers%20To%20Protection.pdf (“Despite the small sample of CBP
interviews observed, USCIRF found several examples of non-compliance with
required procedures . . . .”); Clara Long, “You Don’t Have Rights Here”: US Border
Screening and Returns of Central Americans to Risk of Serious Harm, HUM. RTS.
WATCH
(OCT.
16,
2014)
https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/10/16/
you-dont-have-rights-here/us-border-screening-and-returns-central-americansrisk (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (finding that CBP “cursory screening fails to
identify [asylum seekers]” and that “border officials . . . pressured them to
abandon their claims”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
133. See KATHRYN SHEPHERD & ROYCE BERNSTEIN MURRAY, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL, THE PERILS OF EXPEDITED REMOVAL: HOW FAST-TRACK DEPORTATIONS
JEOPARDIZE ASYLUM SEEKERS 1 (2017), https://www.americanimmigration
council.org/sites/default/files/research/the_perils_of_expedited_removal_how_fas
t-track_deportations_jeopardize_detained_asylum_seekers.pdf
(“[E]xpedited
removal, in conjunction with detention often results in disadvantaging . . . women
and their children held in . . . Texas and Pennsylvania.”).
134. See id. at 5.
135. See id. at 26.
136. See supra notes 121–123 and accompanying text (describing the
rationale of proponents of expedited removal).
137. But see Kari E. Hong & Stephen Manning, Getting it Righted: Access to
Counsel in Rapid Removals, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 673, 693 (2018) (asserting that
legal representation does not necessarily slow down expedited removal).

EXPEDITED REMOVAL AND DUE PROCESS

1349

C. The Problems of CBP
The recent history of CBP inspires justifiable fears that a
surge in hiring or an expansion of mandate (per the Kelly
Memorandum) would be accompanied by inadequate supervision,
misconduct, impunity, and corruption. A rather tactfully entitled
2017 report by anthropologist Josiah Heyman, Why Caution is
Needed Before Hiring Additional Border Patrol Agents and ICE
Officers,138 offers useful insights and admonitions based on
extensive past studies of CBP and ICE. Heyman recounts that CBP
expansion—from 4,287 agents in Fiscal Year (FY) 1994 to 19,828
in FY 2016—has been accompanied by concomitant increases in
civil rights and constitutional violations, misuse of force, off-duty
crimes like domestic violence, and corruption, “including taking
bribes to smuggle drugs or people.”139 The Center for Investigative
Reporting confirmed 153 investigations of CBP personnel between
2000 and 2013.140
Similarly concerning are the frequent, dramatic reports of
excessive force by CBP agents. There were some 1,700 allegations
of excessive force against CBP from 2007 to 2012.141 Such
allegations declined by 26% between FY 2013 and FY 2015; but
then rose by 21% in FY 2016.142 As Heyman concludes, “the agency
has not adequately confronted the vulnerabilities that could result
from the poor management of a mass recruitment of new
agents.”143
It is undoubtedly difficult for researchers to catalogue and
document abuses by CBP agents because the victims of such
misconduct are often quickly deported under expedited removal.144
138. JOSIAH HEYMAN, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, WHY CAUTION IS NEEDED BEFORE
HIRING ADDITIONAL BORDER PATROL AGENTS AND ICE OFFICERS (2017),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/why_ca
ution_is_needed_before_hiring_additional_border_patrol_agents_and_ice_officers_
final.pdf.
139. See id. at 2 (quoting the Associated Press).
140. Id. at 3.
141. Id. at 5.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (presenting the removal
process).
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However, in a 2013 survey of 1,095 deported Mexicans, more than
100 reported physical abuse by U.S. authorities and more than 200
reported verbal abuse.145 Earlier surveys of deported Salvadorans
yielded similar results.146 In 2015, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) reported “agents’ violent, reckless, and threatening
conduct, including physically assaulting non-threatening
motorists; driving aggressively and tailgating at high speeds;
wielding weapons, including knives, electroshock weapons, and
assault rifles in routine traffic encounters; threatening to shoot
motorists or their pets; and mocking and insulting motorists with
profane and derogatory language.”147
Moreover, there have been tremendous discrepancies between
CBP and others about agency oversight of complaints of illegal and
unconstitutional actions by Border Patrol agents, such as
unjustified searches and seizures.148 This comports with other
findings of lax agency oversight and impunity. A 2014 study found
that, of “809 complaints alleging abuse against Border Patrol
agents between January 2009 and January 2012 . . . among those
cases in which a formal decision was issued, 97% resulted in no
action taken.”149
Numerous studies have also found a pervasive, dangerous
“code of silence” in CBP.150 Indeed, DHS itself concluded that “the
‘code’ presents an insidious challenge to workforce integrity, and
requires explicit, targeted and sustained attention.”151 In 2016,
James Tomsheck described CBP culture as “very different from the
rest of U.S. law enforcement. They were an agency that had not
145. HEYMAN, supra note 138, at 7. “The Border Patrol was involved in 67
percent of the physical abuses and 75 percent of verbal abuse incidents.” Id.
146. See id. (“This corresponds closely to rates reported in two previous
systematic surveys of deported Salvadorans.”).
147. Id.
148. See id. (noting mismatch in reporting incidents between Arizona Border
Patrol and DHS oversight agencies).
149. Id. at 9.
150. See, e.g., HEYMAN, supra note 138, at 9 (“[A]n unwritten rule not to report
another colleague’s errors, misconducts, or crimes . . . .”); TODD MILLER, BORDER
PATROL NATION: DISPATCHES FROM THE FRONT LINES OF HOMELAND SECURITY
83– 103 (2014) (reviewing a Border Patrol officer’s difficulties within the agency
after being the subject of a Report of Unethical Behavior).
151. HEYMAN, supra note 138, at 9.
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always been held accountable.”152 During the Obama
Administration, DHS promulgated some reforms for CBP.153
However, the agency’s problems have clearly long been deep and
widespread. As Josiah Heyman reports, most of these reforms have
not been implemented.154
V. Possible Solutions
A. Habeas Reform and Judicial Review
Short of eliminating expedited removal or drastically
overhauling CBP, meaningful judicial oversight of CBP actions
would seem to be a potentially effective safeguard. However, as
noted above, the same 1996 statutes that authorized expedited
removal severely limited the federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear
challenges
on
due
process
or
other
constitutional
155
grounds. Presumably, if Secretary Kelly’s expansion were
undertaken, some avenues would be open.156 Still, habeas
review—the main avenue for constitutional challenges—is well
described as “minimal.”157
152. Id. at 10.
153. See id. at 12 (noting that there were over fifty-three recommendations).
154. See id. (“Although some recommendations have been undertaken, most
have not.”).
155. See Laura W. Murphy & Timothy Edgar, ACLU Comments on INS Notice
to Expand Expedited Removal, AM. C.L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/aclucomments-ins-notice-expand-expedited-removal?redirect=aclu-comments-insnotice-expand-expedited-removal (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (“Expedited
removal . . . currently permits the expulsion, without further review and without
a hearing, of individuals who arrive at the border without valid travel
documents.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); supra note 65
and accompanying text (describing the courts’ limitations).
156. Federal courts have reviewed some legal questions regarding expedited
removal. See, e.g., Pena v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 452, 456–57 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the statute retain some avenues of judicial
review, limited though they may be.”).
157. See NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAW. GUILD, EXPEDITED
REMOVAL: WHAT HAS CHANGED SINCE EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13767, BORDER
SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS (ISSUED ON JANUARY 25,
2017) 4 (2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default
/files/practice_advisory/final_expedited_removal_advisory-_updated_2-21-17.pdf
(“Litigation concerning the scope of habeas review . . . is minimal.”); Smith v. U.S.
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Perhaps the last frontier for substantial constitutional
challenges to expedited removal practices is the Suspension
Clause.158 In the 2016 Third Circuit case of Castro v. United States
Department of Homeland Security,159 twenty-eight families sought
review of their expedited removal orders based on asylum officers’
negative “credible fear determinations.”160 They asserted that if
the expedited removal statute were not construed to provide for
judicial review of such claims, the Suspension Clause would be
violated.161 The Third Circuit held that because petitioners were
“seeking initial admission to the United States,” they had no right
to habeas review under the Suspension Clause even though the
petitioners had physically entered the United States before being
arrested by CBP.162 Thus, the case presented an apparent conflict
between statutory designation of petitioners as seeking admission
and their actual presence on U.S. soil.
The court, however, reasoned that there is “a two-step inquiry
whereby courts must first determine whether a given habeas
petitioner is prohibited from invoking the Suspension Clause due
to some attribute of the petitioner or to the circumstances
surrounding his arrest or detention.”163 Contrary to the
government’s position, which had focused on the second step in this
analysis, the court ruled that petitioners failed at the first step
“because the Supreme Court has unequivocally concluded that ‘an
alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a
privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his
application.’”164 This may be true for some of those who have not
Customs & Border Prot., 741 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We nevertheless
hold that Smith is not entitled to the hearing he seeks, because as applied [the
statute] does not allow review beyond the confines of the statute.”).
158. The Ninth Circuit avoided this issue in Smith, 741 F.3d at 1022 n.6
(“[W]e need not reach the question of whether . . . petitioner . . . might still have
claims under the Suspension Clause . . . .”).
159. 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. den. 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017).
160. Id. at 424–25.
161. See id. at 429 (“Petitioners challenge on appeal the District Court’s
holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction . . . as well as the Court’s
conclusion that [the statute] does not violate the Suspension Clause.”).
162. See id. at 445–46 (denying the petitioners’ claims).
163. Id. at 445 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008)).
164. Id.
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physically set foot on US soil, but it is far from clear as to those
who are already physically present.165
The Third Circuit panel also thought it important that
“[p]etitioners were each apprehended within hours of
surreptitiously entering the United States . . . .”166 This led the
panel to opine that, “we think it appropriate to treat them as
‘alien[s] seeking initial admission to the United States.’”167 This
was surely a rather abrupt and summary resolution of a major
doctrinal dilemma about which the Supreme Court has never been
clear.168 It requires a much more thorough, nuanced, and
historically informed analysis than “we think it appropriate.”169
Nevertheless, the Castro court found that the families could not
“invoke the Constitution, including the Suspension Clause, in an
effort to force judicial review beyond what Congress has already
granted them.”170 If accepted by the Supreme Court, such
reasoning would essentially confirm that much of the United
States is now a Constitution-free zone.

165. See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of
location and limits on executive power).
166. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 445 (3d Cir. 2016).
167. Id.
168. See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text (reviewing the ambiguity).
169. Castro, 835 F.3d at 445. The Castro court also strangely conflated due
process and Suspension Clause analysis—as Steve Vladeck notes, aspects of the
Castro court’s opinion can charitably be termed “simply nuts” because the court
seems to imply that non-citizens physically present within the United States are
less entitled to Suspension Clause protections than enemy belligerents detained
outside the territorial United States. Steve Vladeck, Third Circuit Holds
Suspension Clause Does Not Apply to Non-Citizens Physically (but Not Lawfully)
Present in the United States, JUST SEC. (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.
org/32597/circuit-holds-suspension-clause-apply-non-citizens-physically-butlawfully-present-united-states/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Steve Vladeck, More Trouble for
Undocumented Immigrants and the Suspension Clause, JUST SEC. (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/53822/trouble-undocumented-immigrants-suspensi
on-clause (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (reviewing a companion Ninth Circuit case)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
170. Castro, 835 F.3d at 446.
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The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Castro in April
2017.171 But the basic issues continue to percolate.172 In the Ninth
Circuit, for example, another challenge to expedited removal
brought by an asylum seeker could result in a split from Castro.173
Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, a Tamil asylum seeker who fled Sri
Lanka after claiming that he was abducted and tortured, was
apprehended shortly after crossing the US border.174 He was given
an expedited removal order “after the government determined that
he did not have a credible fear of persecution.”175 He challenged
this disposition through a habeas petition.176 District Court Judge
Anthony J. Battaglia found that the unavailability of habeas for
noncitizens subject to expedited removal did not violate the
Suspension Clause.177 In a remarkably chilling passage, the court
recited the facts of the case, accepted as true for these purposes:
In 2014, Petitioner was approached by men on his farm who
identified themselves as government intelligence officers and
called Petitioner by his name. Petitioner was then pushed into
a van where he was bound, beaten, and interrogated about his
171. See Castro v. Dept. Homeland Sec., 137 S. Ct. 1581, 1581 (2017) (denying
cert).
172. In Kabenga v. Holder, 76 F. Supp. 3d 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), a New York
district court judge found that a petitioner with a bona fide claim that his lawful
permanent resident status had not been lawfully terminated at the time he was
subject to expedited removal was entitled to a stay of removal and an immigration
court hearing. See id. at 481, 486 (establishing facts and issuing a stay); Kabenga
v. Holder, No. 14 Civ. 9084 (SAS), 2015 WL 728205, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2015)
(granting the habeas petition). The case is currently before the Second Circuit.
Kabenga v. Lynch, No. 15-1367 (2d Cir. filed Apr. 27, 2015).
173. I have signed an amicus brief in support of the Petitioner in this case.
See Brief of Scholars of Immigration Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-55313 (9th Cir.
Mar. 8, 2018) (arguing in favor of due process for all persons within the United
States).
174. See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 287 F. Supp. 3d 1077,
1078–79 (S.D. Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-55313 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2018)
(recounting torture event before noting that, “Petitioner entered the United
States where he was apprehended by a Border Patrol Agent”).
175. Id. at 1079.
176. See id. at 1080 (“Petitioner’s emergency motion for a stay of removal
devotes an entire section to asserting that this Court has jurisdiction to hear his
Petition . . . .”).
177. See id. at 1082 (collecting cases to support the ruling).
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political activities . . . . Petitioner then endured additional
torture before he woke up in a hospital where he spent several
days recovering. . . . Petitioner went into hiding in Sri Lanka
and India, and then in 2016 he fled the country.178

Notwithstanding the terrible power of these facts, the court
concluded that the “strict restraints on this Court’s jurisdictional
reach to review expedited removal orders does not violate the
Suspension Clause.”179 The essential, if rather chilling principle is
that “a litigant may be unconstitutionally denied a forum when
there is absolutely no avenue for judicial review of a colorable claim
of constitutional deprivation.”180 The judge also expressly cited the
district court opinion in Castro, the “analysis and ultimate
conclusion [of which] are incredibly persuasive to the Court.”181
Thuraissigiam’s habeas petition was thus dismissed and his
motion for an emergency stay of removal was denied.182 If legal
challenges of this type are indeed a “testing crucible,” it is hard to
imagine a more tragic conclusion than this:
The Court does not downplay the important role courts across
the nation have in safeguarding the reliability and fairness of
the immigration process. However, no matter how credible
Petitioner’s claims of fear may be and the purported harsh
consequences that may come to him if he is removed to his
native country, the limited scope of this Court’s judicial review
over expedited removal orders restricts it from hearing
Petitioner’s claims.183

The case is now before the Ninth Circuit on appeal.184 The
essence of Petitioners’ argument is that “noncitizens have always
been able to test the legality of their removal through habeas
178. Id. at 1078 (internal citations omitted).
179. Id. at 1082.
180. Id. (citing Pena v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 452, 456 (9th Cir. 2015)); see also id.
(citing Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1141–42 (9th
Cir. 2008) for the proposition that “narrow habeas review . . . does not violate the
Suspension Clause”).
181. Thuraissigiam, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 1083.
182. See id. at 1083–84 (declaring final orders).
183. Id. at 1083.
184. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 287 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (S.D.
Cal.), appeal docketed, No. 18-55313 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2018).
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corpus, and neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever
allowed Congress to eliminate that review.”185 If the District Court
were to be affirmed, it would thus be the first time that either the
Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court “permitted a noncitizen who
entered the country to be removed without judicial scrutiny of the
legality of the removal.”186
B. Lawyers?
One of the most problematic aspects of expedited removal
cases is the extreme difficulty in obtaining counsel. As many
studies have shown, counsel can make a dramatic difference in
outcomes in “regular” removal cases.187 And yet, claims of a mere
right to access to counsel—not a right to appointed counsel—in
expedited removal have rarely been brought and, so far as I am
aware, have never succeeded.188 For most of expedited removal’s
existence, the agencies in charge have strenuously resisted
allowing counsel to participate in the process.189
In a recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v.
Peralta-Sanchez,190 a panel found that a noncitizen had no Fifth
Amendment due process right to hire counsel in expedited
removal.191 Although the court’s opinion has since been
185. Opening Brief of Appellant at 17, Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 18-55313 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2018).
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to
Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (“Moreover, we find
that immigrants with attorneys fared far better . . . .”).
188. See KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43613, ALIEN’S RIGHT TO
COUNSEL
IN
REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS:
IN
BRIEF
1
n.4
(2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43613.pdf (collecting unsuccessful cases).
189. See EMILY CREIGHTON & ROBERT PAUW, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, RIGHT TO
COUNSEL BEFORE DHS 1 (2011) (“In many encounters with immigration agencies
in the non-removal context, an attorney’s access to his or her noncitizen client is
limited.”).
190. 847 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2017), opinion withdrawn on grant of reh’g, 868
F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2017), and on reh’g, 705 Fed. Appx. 542 (9th Cir. 2017).
191. See id. at 1139 (refusing to find that “aliens who illegally enter the
United States and are subject to expedited removal proceedings . . . are
constitutionally entitled to counsel”).
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withdrawn,192 its reasoning is significant, as this issue is likely to
recur. The majority conceded that Peralta was entitled to some due
process, but the key question was: “To what process—statutory
and constitutional—was Peralta entitled?”193
Regarding counsel, the court first concluded that there was no
such statutory right, either through the immigration statutes or
the APA.194 After asserting that the need for deference is
particularly powerful in the area of immigration and
naturalization, the court then rather quickly dismissed Peralta’s
due process claim.195 Applying the familiar Mathews v. Eldridge196
framework, the court first concluded, formalistically, that “[t]hese
proceedings are essentially exclusion proceedings, even if they can
in some instances be applied to aliens who may have technically
effected entry into the United States—like Peralta . . . .”197
Moreover, the court asserted that expedited removal only “targets
aliens who have either no residence here or only a limited
residence.”198 “Such an alien’s interest in remaining in the United
States[,]” continued the panel, “is therefore much more limited
than that of an alien already living here who has been placed in
formal removal proceedings and stands to lose, perhaps, formal
legal status here, and certainly the life he or she has created
here.”199 As to the “risk of error” factor, “the class of aliens to which
expedited removal applies” was said to be “fairly narrow,” and the
analysis required was seen as “straightforward” and “a relatively
simple exercise” (at least as to those who do not claim asylum).200
192. 847 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2017), opinion withdrawn on grant of reh’g, 868
F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2017), and on reh’g, 705 Fed. Appx. 542 (9th Cir. 2017).
193. Id. at 1132.
194. See id. at 1134 (“Peralta has no statutory right to obtain counsel in an
expedited proceeding.”).
195. See id. at 1142 (“Peralta had no Fifth Amendment due process right to
counsel in the expedited removal proceeding . . . .”). Hong and Manning suggest
that this may be incorrect. See Hong & Manning, supra note 137, at 696–703
(discussing Peralta-Sanchez).
196. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
197. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d at 1135.
198. Id.
199. Id. Peralta had, in fact, first come to the United States in 1979. Id. at
1128.
200. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d at 1136.
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As noted above, these are all highly contestable claims which, one
hopes, may eventually achieve more thoughtful and thorough
resolution by the Supreme Court.
Peralta had argued that “counsel could provide assistance in
cases like his, where a subsequent change in the law calls into
question a previous order of removal.”201 The court disputed that
expedited removal cases are sufficiently complicated to necessitate
counsel.202 In my experience with post-deportation cases, however,
there can be quite important roles for counsel to play.
Finally, the majority saw counsel as a burden on the
government in this context. There would be “costs to the
government that would result from the inevitable delay if an alien
is entitled to seek counsel” including detention costs, and the need
for government lawyers to respond.203 In short, the majority
concluded, introduction of counsel risks destroying the “expedited”
removal process as such.204 There is clearly much with which one
might argue in this analysis. But it does appear that, as of this
writing, a right of access to counsel in expedited removal seems
unlikely to be achieved through litigation.205
This leaves us with few realistic solutions and with real
concerns for the future of expedited immigration enforcement in
the Trump era. Still, energetic lawyers may find ways. One can
certainly envision, for example, a continuation of creative delaying
(what I have called “monkey-wrench”) legal strategies such as
those illustrated by a recent New York case in which a judge
agreed that there must be, at least, “the freedom to say goodbye.”206
In a recent Boston case, in which I appeared as an expert witness,
a judge granted a preliminary injunction to slow the deportation of
201. Id. at 1137.
202. See id. (“Expedited removal proceedings, by design, involve none of these
complications [present in removal proceedings] . . . .”).
203. Id. at 1138.
204. See id. (finding that expedited removal would turn into a trial-like
proceeding).
205. But see Hong & Manning, supra note 137, at 678 (arguing “that
speed . . . is compatible with meaningful access to counsel at three different
stages of an expedited removal proceeding”).
206. Ragbir v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-236, 2018 WL 623557, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
29, 2018).
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a group of Indonesian asylum-seekers on the grounds that
compelling them to prepare motions to reopen from abroad could
constitute irreparable procedural harm.207 Such strategies are
clearly less capacious and optimal than a full throated acceptance
of habeas corpus jurisdiction and due process protections, but they
may be all that is left for the moment. Still, though they are easy
to disparage and to mock, we should note the historical resonance
of strategies of this type. Abolitionist lawyers famously used
similar methods to oppose the Fugitive Slave laws in the 1850s.208
One might return, again, to the words of Henry Hart:
The law belongs to the people of the country, and to the
hundreds of thousands of lawyers and judges who through the
years have struggled, in their behalf, to make it coherent and
intelligible and responsive to the people’s sense of
justice. . . . The appeal to principle is still open and, so long as
courts of the United States sit with general jurisdiction in
habeas corpus, that means an appeal to them and their
successors.209

C. Post-removal Review?
On the administrative/managerial side, I also would
suggest—as a stop gap solution—a new idea: a post-removal
review system. Even those who support expedited removal must
recognize the prevalence of errors and the history of agency
problems.210 It has become apparent that the number of wrongful

207. See Devitri v. Cronen, 289 F. Supp. 3d 287, 295 (D. Mass. 2018), appeal
docketed, No. 18-1281 (1st Cir. Apr. 6, 2018) (finding that reviewing motion to
reopen post-removal “does not meet the requirements of due process because of
the significance of the liberty interests at stake”). What was perhaps most
astonishing to ponder in this case was that the same judge concluded that she
had no jurisdiction to review the argument that the petitioners would also face
torture and persecution abroad. See Transcript of Motion Hearing on Preliminary
Injunction at 31–33, Devitri v. Cronen, 289 F. Supp. 3d 287 (D. Mass. 2018) (No.
17-11842) (expressing trepidation on ruling on torture claim).
208. See, e.g., In re Sims, 61 Mass. 285, 294, 310 (1851) (reviewing
unsuccessful challenge as to the constitutionality of fugitive slave laws).
209. See Hart, supra note 3, at 1396 (presenting the crucible formulation).
210. See supra Part IV (reviewing mistakes and abuses in the system).
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removals has increased and will likely continue to do so.211 If we
are to be wedded to expeditious enforcement models, why not build
in a safeguard? Let me emphasize what should be obvious: that I
would not consider this a substitute for due process or counsel. It
would merely be an extra layer of protection. A person who feels
that an injustice was done in their case could contact this
office—which should be staffed by independent attorneys—for a
review of their matter. We have done this—at relatively little
cost—at the Post Deportation Human Rights Project at Boston
College Law School in conjunction with staff in Guatemala, and
with input from NGO’s around the world.212 The complexities are
not trivial; but the possible benefits are great. These post-removal
attorneys might also be granted special access to the oversight
authorities within DHS or, perhaps, to some special form of Motion
to Reconsider by adjudicators. The oft-criticized incentives for
“delay” would not be present. Presumably, only those who felt that
that they were truly wronged would avail themselves of this
long-shot remedy. Lawyers would not spend time on such cases
unless they concluded that a real injustice had been done. My
belief—based on many years of experience with such cases—is that
many wrongs could be righted in this way. But let me be clear: this
proposal should not be taken as an endorsement or a legitimation
of expedited removal, as post-removal practice is difficult,
cumbersome, and clearly inferior to representation and judicial
review in the first instance.

211. See, e.g., Part V.A (reviewing modern challenges to wrongful removal).
212. See M. Brinton Lykes et al., The Post-Deportation Human Rights Project:
Participatory Action Research with Maya Transnational Families, 34 PRACTICING
ANTHROPOLOGY 22, 22–26 (2012) (detailing the project’s work with Latino and
Maya
families),
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/humanrights
/pdf/Lykes%20PA34%201%20post-deportation.pdf.

